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ABSTRACT 
 
We briefly review the well-known risks, weaknesses and limitations of spreadsheets and then 
introduce some more. We review and slightly extend our previous work on the importance 
and criticality of spreadsheets in the City of London, introducing the notions of ubiquity, 
centrality, legality  and contagion. We identify the sector of the financial market that we 
believed in 2005 to be highly dependant on the use of spreadsheets and relate this to its 
recent catastrophic financial performance. We outline the rôle of spreadsheets in the collapse 
of the Jamaican banking system in the late 1990’s and then review the UK financial 
regulator’s knowledge of the risks of spreadsheets in the contemporary financial system. We 
summarise the available evidence and suggest that there is a link between the use of 
spreadsheets and the recent collapse of the global financial system. We provide governments 
and regulating authorities with some simple recommendations to reduce the risks of 
continued overdependence on unreliable spreadsheets. We conclude with three fundamental 
lessons from a century of human error research.  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Four years ago [Croll, 2005], we interviewed anonymously 23 senior individuals to 
determine their views regarding the importance and criticality of spreadsheets in the City of 
London, where they all worked. The details of our motivation, methodology, selection of 
participants, method of data collection and the background and structure of the interviews are 
given in that earlier paper. Interviewees provided much useful information, which was best 
summarized by a financial regulator:  
 
“Spreadsheets are integral to the function and operation of the global financial 
system”  
 
This succinct comment was reviewed and validated by a senior investment research 
professional working in a first tier investment bank who added: 
  
“Agreed. In addition I would say that the majority of people who use the financial 
system are not appreciative of the rôle that spreadsheets play” 
 
Based upon the evidence provided by the interviewees, and the historical evidence of the 
weaknesses and limitations of spreadsheets, we concluded our article thus: 
 
“Spreadsheets have been shown to be fallible, yet they underpin the operation of the 
financial system. If the uncontrolled use of spreadsheets continues to occur in highly 
leveraged markets and companies, it is only a matter of time before another ‘Black 
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Swan’ event occurs [Taleb, 2001], causing catastrophic loss. It is completely within 
the realms of possibility that a single, large, complex but erroneous spreadsheet could 
directly cause the accidental loss of a corporation or institution, significantly 
damaging the City of London’s reputation” 
 
At the time, this conclusion was felt to be rather bold, however following distribution of the 
paper to the interviewees and during the peer review process, no adverse comments arose and 
the text was left as written. We are thus in the position of having: 
 
i) An extensive spreadsheets risks research base which identifies spreadsheets 
as a considerable weakness in organisations 
ii) Research evidence outlining the ubiquity, importance and criticality of 
spreadsheets in the City of London  
iii) An a priori hypothesis about catastrophic financial loss due the use of 
untested spreadsheets in the City of London and 
iv) A systemically collapsed financial system deeply affecting the City of 
London 
 
Our present research hypothesis, an extension of iii) above, is to determine by a methodical 
examination of the evidence available to us whether or not spreadsheets played a rôle in the 
collapse of the global financial system.  
 
We now review the spreadsheet risks research base and our previous work in more detail, 
extending the work slightly by adding some email and other evidence that was omitted. We 
then examine the rôle played by spreadsheets in the collapse of the Jamaican banking system 
in the late 1990’s. Following this, we outline the UK Financial Regulator’s knowledge of the 
problems with spreadsheets by reviewing and summarising a series of public presentations on 
the issue. We cover briefly the fiduciary duty of UK company directors and their compliance 
in light of their permitting the extensive use of untested and uncontrolled spreadsheets in 
financial recording and reporting. Following our conclusions we repeat and then extend a set 
of simple recommendations. 
 
2. SPREADSHEET RISKS RESEARCH 
 
There is a very extensive research base on the risks of using spreadsheets within business 
[Panko, 2000][Panko & Ordway, 2005][Powell, Baker & Lawson, 2008]. Much of the 
research has been coordinated and progressed by the European Spreadsheet Risks Interest 
Group [Chadwick, 2003][EuSpRIG, 2009]. Further significant work improving the end user 
approach to software has been undertaken by the EUSES consortium [EUSES, 2009]. The 
main known risks of spreadsheets include: 
 
a) Human Error – To err is human, hence the majority (>90%) of spreadsheets 
contain errors. Because spreadsheets are rarely tested [Panko, 2006][Pryor, 2004] 
these errors remain. Recent research has shown that about 50% of spreadsheet 
models used operationally in large businesses have material defects [Powell, 
Baker, Lawson, 2007] [Croll, 2008]. Approximately 50% of executives recently 
surveyed had encountered spreadsheet related problems up to and including staff 
dismissal [Caulkins, Morrison & Weideman, 2007]. 
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b) Fraud – Because of the ease with which program code and data is mixed, 
spreadsheets are the perfect environment for perpetrating fraud [Mittermeir, 
Clermont, Hodnigg, 2005]. The $600m fraud perpetrated by John Rusnak at 
AIB/Allfirst was spreadsheet related [Butler, 2002]. Other spreadsheet related 
frauds have occurred and have been notified to the regulator, but have not been 
reported. 
c) Overconfidence – Because spreadsheet users do not go looking for errors, they 
don’t find any or many. Spreadsheet users are therefore overconfident in their use 
of spreadsheets [Panko, 2003] 
d) Interpretation – Translation of a business problem into the spreadsheet domain 
can “…lead to a position where decision makers may act in the belief that 
decisions can be made with confidence on the output from the spreadsheet 
despite evidence to the contrary” [Banks & Monday, 2002]  
e) Archiving – “The case of failed Jamaican commercial banks demonstrates how 
poor archiving can lead to weaknesses in spreadsheet control that contribute to 
operational risk” [Lemieux, 2005]. We review this case history of a recent 
systemic banking collapse in a later section. 
 
Unfolding events suggest that there are several further categories of risks related to 
spreadsheets that have not been studied at all: 
 
f) Assumptions – Most spreadsheet models rely upon a fairly lengthy series of 
explicit or more usually, implicit, assumptions. Not least of these is the Ceteris 
Paribus assumption of all other things being (or remaining) equal. Clearly the 
assumptions underlying many spreadsheet models now no longer apply.  
g) Opacity – Initial use of a spreadsheet gives a feeling of transparency, where any 
and all aspects of the model can be clearly addressed and viewed. With larger 
models, more complex models, badly structured models or models that have been 
developed by somebody else, the spreadsheet becomes opaque and unwieldy. 
h) Reification – Once information is put into a spreadsheet, it becomes concrete: 
“… things changed with the intrusion of the spreadsheet. When you put an Excel 
spreadsheet into computer-literate hands you get a ‘sales projection’ effortlessly 
extending ad infinitum! Once on paper or on a computer screen …..the 
projection takes on a life of its own, losing its vagueness and abstraction and 
becoming what philosophers call reified, invested with concreteness; it takes on 
a new life as a tangible object” [Taleb, 2007] 
i) Enterprise Interoperability – The interconnected heterogeneous nature of the 
financial system and the spreadsheets contained within it require us to recognise 
that we can no longer continue with the closed world deterministic assumptions 
of traditional IT: “…for with globalisation we are no longer concerned with 
intra-operability contained within closed systems but with inter-operability 
between open systems. The closed world assumption of Gödel completeness has 
been adequate for the logic of closed systems but his undecidable theorems show 
that the logic of open systems needs to go beyond a mathematics of axioms, sets 
and number”. [Heather & Rossiter, 2008]. Heather recently expressed the view 
that this issue underpinned the present crisis [Heather, 2008]. 
  
The above points comprise a high level taxonomy of spreadsheet risks. There has been 
substantive previous work on taxonomies of spreadsheet errors [Rajalingham et al, 
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2000][Panko, 2008]. We note that previous taxonomies do not address issues relating to the 
risks involved in the use of large systems of interlinked spreadsheets or some of the other 
human factors identified above.  
 
3. THE RÔLE OF SPREADSHEETS IN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
 
Our previous paper [Croll, 2005] gave a reasonably comprehensive view of how spreadsheets 
are used in the City of London. More recent direct personal experience in the Enterprise 
Spreadsheet Management System marketplace [Baxter, 2007] [Saadat, 2007] [Perry, 2008] 
within the City of London and other global financial centres provided further useful 
information. We did not find any evidence which contradicted that reported previously. We 
summarise the various themes developed in our earlier paper, relating them to current events 
and adding several other aspects.  
 
3.1 Ubiquity 
 
Amongst a number of observations highlighting the truly ubiquitous use of spreadsheets in 
the City of London, we made an observation that: 
 
“Spreadsheets are particularly heavily used in the more innovative and hence more 
recent parts of the market, particularly credit derivatives, an area of the market with a 
significant daily turnover” 
 
We note that Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO’s), are a popular form of credit 
derivative. CDO’s offer a structured payoff depending upon default levels of underlying 
assets (including further CDO’s) and have played a significant part in the present financial 
crisis, earning the sobriquet “Toxic Debt”. There is good evidence that CDO’s are valued 
within complex spreadsheets: 
 
“Standard & Poor’s CDO Evaluator Handbook Version 3.0. An Introduction to and 
operational overview of Standard & Poor’s Evaluator Tool, an automated spreadsheet 
application used for rapid, complex evaluation of the credit quality of CDO asset 
portfolios”. [Standard & Poor’s, 2006] 
 
Note that we have not examined this spreadsheet, only the published documentation, in the 
manner of our analysis of some spreadsheet documentation used in clinical medicine [Croll & 
Butler, 2006]. 
 
Recently, the UK operation of a large international investment bank was fined £5.6m for 
breaches of several regulatory principles by the Financial Services Authority: 
 
“2.33.3. The booking structure relied upon by the UK operations of Credit Suisse for 
the CDO trading business was complex and overly reliant on large spreadsheets with 
multiple entries. This resulted in a lack of transparency and inhibited the effective 
supervision, risk management and control of the SCG {Structured Credit Group}” 
[FSA, 2008]. 
 
The problems with CDO’s were first identified in 2007, however the full system collapse did 
not start until a year later: 
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“….Merrill Lynch & Co.'s threat to sell $800 million of mortgage securities seized 
from Bear Stearns Cos. hedge funds is sending shudders across Wall Street. A sale 
would give banks, brokerages and investors the one thing they want to avoid: a real 
price on the bonds in the fund that could serve as a benchmark. The securities are 
known as collateralised debt obligations, which exceed $1 trillion and comprise the 
fastest-growing part of the bond market. Because there is little trading in the 
securities, prices may not reflect the highest rate of mortgage delinquencies in 13 
years. An auction that confirms concerns that CDOs are overvalued may spark a chain 
reaction of write downs that causes billions of dollars in losses for everyone from 
hedge funds to pension funds to foreign banks. Bear Stearns, the second-biggest 
mortgage bond underwriter, also is the biggest broker to hedge funds.” [Pittman, 
2007] 
 
Note that since there was very little trading in CDO’s, the financial valuations expressed in 
CDO spreadsheet models were reified in the manner summarised earlier by Taleb.  
 
Note also that spreadsheet use in the Peoples Republic of China may be less ubiquitous than 
in the West [Turner, 1995] and may provide a useful contrast in future research. 
 
Our previous observations about the ubiquity of spreadsheets and their heavy use in the more 
recent credit derivatives marketplace are therefore well founded. Complex financial 
instruments such as CDO’s are implemented within, and valued by, large and complex 
spreadsheets. At least one large firm has been fined by the financial regulator for failure to 
control these spreadsheets. CDO’s and other credit derivatives played a leading rôle in the 
collapse of the global financial system. 
 
3.2 Importance 
 
Recent discussions with the senior management teams at a variety of financial institutions 
revealed that spreadsheets continue to play a rôle at least as important as that depicted in our 
earlier paper. We give some examples, though there are very many more: 
 
a) We were asked to investigate a spreadsheet belonging to a top investment fund that 
was a member of the Investment Management Association (IMA). The spreadsheet 
entitled (perhaps) BALDEC08.XLS contained the profit & loss statement & balance 
sheet of the fund for 31 Dec 08. The Net Asset Value closely matched that on the 
IMA website. This large & complex spreadsheet had not undergone any formal 
testing or approval and was undocumented [Payette, 2006], unprotected and 
uncontrolled. 
 
b) One very large institution with over 750 business critical spreadsheets in use in the 
finance and other departments, recently employed in excess of 30 specialist 
contractors for a substantial period to remediate and validate these spreadsheets prior 
to placing them under a formal system of control.  
 
c) A large bank was using a suite of several hundred spreadsheets to underpin the 
operations of one of its key lending departments. There was no evidence that any 
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formal testing of these spreadsheets had taken place and at the time of writing they 
were uncontrolled.  
 
d) A trading desk of a large foreign bank used spreadsheets as the basis for its 
derivatives operations.  
 
The firm in the second example above was one of only a handful of UK organisations known 
to be systematically and professionally addressing business critical spreadsheets used in 
financial reporting and other important processes. By contrast, we became aware of some 
large organisations who were simply placing, or intending to place, untested spreadsheet 
applications under formal control, without testing or validating them first.   One or two very 
large firms had set up manual spreadsheet control systems, which are known to fall into 
disrepair within a year or so. One FTSE 100 organisation denied the use of spreadsheets for 
anything other than innocuous purposes. The denial was less than convincing. 
 
It would appear to be the case that there are presently about 25 departmental installations of 
Enterprise Spreadsheet Management systems within the City of London. That is, a small 
fraction of the institutions have begun to acknowledge the importance of spreadsheets and 
have asserted a need to discover, risk assess, test and control them. Most of these installations 
are within institutions that became insolvent and were subsequently bailed out by the 
authorities. It would appear to be the case, at present, that the overwhelming majority of key 
& critical spreadsheets used within UK based (and by implication, global) financial 
institutions are completely uncontrolled and that about 50% of them are also untested. 
 
3.3 Criticality 
 
We previously defined a critical spreadsheet as one where:  
 
“Material error could compromise a government, a regulator, a financial market, or 
other significant public entity and cause a breach of the law and/or individual or 
collective fiduciary duty. May place those responsible at significant risk of criminal 
and/or civil legal proceedings and/or disciplinary action” 
 
The large number of spreadsheets containing the details and valuations of myriad CDO’s and 
other complex financial instruments have clearly compromised governments, regulators and 
financial markets. As the magnitude of the present financial crisis has become clear, fingers 
of blame are beginning to search for causes and those responsible. We believe that 
spreadsheets, and those who used them, or permitted their use, in ignorance of the well-
known risks [e.g. Miller, 2005] and consequences, share much of the blame. Given the risks 
of using spreadsheets and their ubiquity in financial trading, recording and reporting, it is 
difficult to see how most organisations comply with the basic tenets of the Companies Act, 
let alone higher statutes such as Sarbanes Oxley and Basle II [Panko & Ordway, 2005]. 
 
3.4 Legality 
 
The question of the fiduciary responsibility of company directors and officers in relation to 
the use of untested and uncontrolled business critical spreadsheets has been initially 
addressed [Cleary, Norris-Jones, Madahar, 2005]. The general question of fiduciary duty 
given the present circumstances, is within the current debate [Price, 2009]. The UK 
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Companies Act is very clear on the requirement that directors shall keep accurate records, as 
section 221 of the act states that: 
 
(1) Every company shall keep accounting records which are sufficient to show and 
explain the company's transactions and are such as to— 
  
(2) disclose with reasonable accuracy, at any time, the financial position of the 
company at that time, and 
 
(3) enable the directors to ensure that any balance sheet and profit and loss account 
prepared under this Part complies with the requirements of this Act 
 
Clearly, given that approximately half of spreadsheets used in the operational and financial 
management of large corporates have been found to be materially defective, it would appear 
to be the case that, in recent years, many directors of UK based banks and financial 
institutions may not have fully complied with section 221 of the Companies Act. We suggest 
that it may indeed be unlawful for companies to continue using untested and uncontrolled 
spreadsheets in critical parts of the financial recording and recording infrastructure. The issue 
of undue reliance on (spreadsheet based) financial models has now come before the UK 
courts [Herman, 2008]  
 
Moreover, in our view, fiduciary responsibility in respect of the use and misuse of 
spreadsheets lies both sides of the regulatory divide. 
 
3.4 Centrality 
 
The FSA’s Gabriel and Gabriella [FSA, 2009] systems for collecting periodic (i.e. daily, 
weekly, monthly & annual) statutory financial information from regulated institutions are 
spreadsheet based. The Bank of England likewise routinely collects financial information 
from across the markets on spreadsheets. The daily cash reconciliations performed by the 
clearing banks after the 15:30 daily close are performed on spreadsheets [BCS, 2000].  There 
exists within the City of London a critical spreadsheet called LIBOR.XLS. The capital 
adequacy ratios of the institutions were known to be stored and monitored from within a 
regulator’s spreadsheet. 
 
The regulating authorities use spreadsheets as intensively as market participants, but in this 
case spreadsheets are used for the purposes of monitoring, regulating and forecasting the 
markets themselves. There is little evidence that regulators have put in place control 
processes to manage the spreadsheets they use to manage the financial system. 
 
3.5 Contagion 
 
Back in 2005, the anonymous UK regulatory interviewee clearly understood the relationship 
between Value at Risk (VAR), Tail Risk, Regulatory Capital & Financial Contagion. The 
following email was omitted from our earlier paper: 
 
“…it might be useful to give a sense of how much capital is at risk.  Institutions 
measure market risk by VAR {Value at Risk}, which is to a 99% confidence level, daily 
horizon.  Capital is set at between 10 and 20 times that number.  ‘Tail risk’ is the risk 
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of extreme events, where all capital held by a firm is lost (and where potentially it is 
forced into default).  This could be 40 times VAR or more, i.e. multiples of the capital 
buffer, and when this gets to such high levels, this has a ‘contagion effect’ – the firm 
cannot pay creditors out of capital, the creditors also realise losses, perhaps they too 
are forced into insolvency, thus forcing other firms, and so on.  The total amount at 
risk in the global system is massive (obviously).  How much of this is managed on 
spreadsheets?  We don't know for sure, but we have specific examples where this 
happens.  We also have a number of concrete examples where the spreadsheets (one 
due to a complex cell formula) failed.  In one case a loss was realised.  In another, 
there was a significant period when the risk was being mismanaged – fortunately this 
had the effect of reducing the risk, rather than increasing it.  This risk impacts one of 
the FSA's 4 core objectives, which is market stability”. [FSA, 2005a] 
 
The email was omitted because there was then no clear or definite link between spreadsheets 
and financial contagion. Plus of course, the risks of contagion were perceived to be small at 
the time. The fact that the UK regulator raised the issue of the relationship between financial 
contagion and spreadsheets is now an interesting point. 
 
The author is aware of large spreadsheets incorporating monte carlo simulation techniques  
having been in widespread use in the past to calculate the Value at Risk of large firms. The 
UK regulator is also more recently aware of such use, expressing certain technical concerns: 
 
“We have come across some firms that perform Monte Carlo simulations for capital 
calculations using standard personal computer spreadsheet…this may prove 
inadequate when making a robust assessment of capital…”. [FSA, 2008a] 
 
The degree to which it has been possible to calculate daily VAR on assets & liabilities where 
the primary transaction record is a spreadsheet is not known. 
 
4 THE RÔLE OF SPREADSHEETS IN THE COLLAPSE OF THE JAMAICAN 
BANKING SYSTEM 
 
The Jamaican Banking System collapsed in its entirety in the late 1990’s partly due to the use 
of spreadsheets and a consequent failure to manage and control them [Lemieux, 2002, 2005].  
 
The Jamaican banks relied heavily on spreadsheets because their major transaction 
processing and risk management systems failed to meet their management information and 
reporting requirements. Former employees of the failed banks revealed in later interviews 
that they had used spreadsheets in the following ways: 
 
- Cash management 
- Financial budgeting and control 
- Analysis of product and customer profitability 
- Analysis of the cost of capital 
- Foreign Exchange management 
- Credit decision management 
- Interest rate sensitivity analysis 
- Financial risk management 
- Recording of proprietary transactions 
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The pattern of usage of spreadsheets in Jamaica in the late 1990’s as outlined above is a 
small subset of the present pattern of usage of spreadsheets in the City of London and 
other major financial centres. The particular problems that gave rise to the Jamaican 
financial collapse were clear: 
 
- Individualistic naming of files. These idiosyncratic file names obscured the 
content and purpose of the files, divorced the files from the business process and 
the people creating them (particularly if an individual had left the bank), 
prevented easy access and made management reporting very difficult. 
 
- Ad hoc assignment of storage location. Important files were stored on personal 
hard drives without any document management, backup or archiving. 
 
- No Document Retention policy. Data was deleted at the whim of the individual 
so that banks financial positions could not be calculated accurately or even at all. 
  
- Failure to preserve a link to the business context. This rendered spreadsheets 
meaningless as a background to a particular business decision. 
 
- Inability to guarantee the authenticity and reliability of spreadsheets. There were 
no controls over how spreadsheets were archived and no effort was made to 
"lock" down their content as part of a formal archiving process. As a result, their 
integrity was seriously questionable, since anyone could have changed the content 
in the intervening period and audit trail controls were weak to non-existent. 
 
The problems with spreadsheets caused numerous problems, including: 
 
 “Poor control over spreadsheets at Jamaican indigenous banks contributed to 
management information and external reporting problems (i.e., P&L distortions) that 
contributed to the banks' management and external regulators losing sight of the 
banks' true positions and exposures. This problem fed a downward spiral into liquidity 
crisis”[Lemieux, 2005] 
 
and 
 
“As the Jamaican financial crisis unfolded, the government also recognised that fraud 
and corruption had contributed to the collapse of indigenous banks. To address these 
allegations, it established a team of foreign and local forensic auditors to work with 
the police fraud squad to identify and take action on instances of fraud. Inaccessibility 
of source documents, however, seriously hampered the auditors' work. The work of 
reconstructing what in some cases were very convoluted financial transactions was 
made extremely difficult by the fact that critical records, many in spreadsheet form, 
were missing”. [Lemieux, 2005] 
 
It is highly likely that these limitations in spreadsheet management and control 
experienced in Jamaica during the late 1990’s are now being experienced in the wider, 
global economy.  
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5. UK REGULATOR’S KNOWLEDGE OF SPREADSHEET RISK 
 
On four occasions during the period 2003-2007, an employee of the UK Financial Services 
Authority gave the keynote address at the annual conference of the European Spreadsheet 
Risks Interest Group [FSA, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007]. 
 
The first presentation “[End] User Computing in Financial Regulation”, outlined the FSA’s 
approach. The FSA did not view End User Computing (EUC) as a bad thing, as it was 
essential to business efficiency: 
 
“The FSA is not, and never has been opposed to the use of spreadsheet and other user-
developed applications for business critical purposes”. [FSA, 2003] 
 
It was clear however that the regulator expected appropriate controls to be in place. At that 
time it was clear that the senior management (of regulated firms) thought that end user 
computing was “bad” and sought to replace it with a “strategic” IT solution. Development of 
strategic solutions was hampered by the “budget paradox”. Generally, it was impossible to 
find a budget for any form of IT development required by the business, which implied that 
the firm could not afford it. However, it was always the case that some salaried employee of 
the firm could find the time, and a non-IT budget, to develop the required solution, which 
implied that the firm could afford it. This inevitably led to poorly managed solutions. It was 
clear to the FSA that EUC solutions were cheap to develop, but that the resulting disasters 
were not cheap. A change of mindset was called for, with attention being paid to training, 
standards and the traditional IT concerns of auditability, testability and maintainability. At 
the time, the view was that IT auditors focussed their attention on large information systems 
and tended to regard spreadsheets as being user problems, not of their concern.  
 
The second presentation “Why Banks use Spreadsheets” sought to distinguish business 
critical applications from non business critical applications, identified the typical uses of 
spreadsheets illustrated by two case studies and concluded with a look of the cost of controls. 
The regulators position on the use of spreadsheets within business critical systems was clear:   
 
“It is crucial to distinguish so-called ‘business critical’ systems from all others.  
Financial regulators are primarily worried, for obvious reasons, about systems which 
are crucial to the successful and safe running of businesses.  For example, systems 
which support the provisioning of liquidity to the money markets, which support global 
foreign exchange platforms, [or] which control the management of financial risk. This 
talk is concerned only with ‘business critical’ systems. I will talk about how many 
banks use business critical systems implemented on spreadsheets, based on evidence 
from many years of supervising banking systems”. [FSA, 2004] 
 
The regulator defined a business critical system as any system whose function is critical to 
the running of a business. Business critical systems were systems which: have more than one 
user; where the user probably doesn’t know the “right answer”; where they were performing 
a cyclical or repetitive task; where there was usually data processing of some kind going on 
such as aggregation, enrichment, checking or MIS. Note that this definition of criticality 
differs from our own definition. Furthermore: 
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“Business critical applications are typically developed out of ‘one off’ spreadsheets 
which were not thrown away because they were seen to perform a useful routine 
function.  Because the function was so routine and boring, they ‘give’ it to some less 
highly paid individual who does not understand what the spreadsheet is doing, with 
some instructions that s/he is able to follow only on a highly literal basis. [The] 
operator has little incentive to get the answer right apart from the fact they are paid to 
do it” [FSA, 2004] 
 
and 
 
“Financial regulators see a lot of business critical applications developed on 
spreadsheets.  They worry a lot about them, in case (a) they go wrong and the firm 
loses a lot of money in a way that disrupts the operation of the financial system.  This 
has happened before, though not because of spreadsheet systems (so far) [and] (b) 
someone exploits the inherent security vulnerability of spreadsheets to commit some 
bad crime.  This HAS happened before.” [FSA, 2004] 
 
The reasons why end users build systems, rather than wait for IT to build them were 
clearly articulated: 
 
“User developed systems, by contrast are built by small teams of people who 
understand exactly their own requirements, and are motivated to build exactly what 
they require in order to achieve their primary goal, which is a tool to further their 
business.  Every minute they spend on the system (for them) is wasted effort, because 
they want to do something else.  They only build the system because, without it, they 
cannot do what they actually want.  Thus they have a strong incentive to minimise 
costs, and have by and large no reason to incur those costs in the first place.” [FSA, 
2004] 
 
The third and fourth presentations, in 2005 and 2007 both entitled “Regulatory Update” 
reviewed the progress on the Spreadsheet issue within regulated institutions over the 
preceding several years. 
 
In the regulators view, the management mind set had changed as spreadsheets were 
increasingly accepted as strategic solutions, which was a major change from five years 
previously. Many firms had given up on the ‘big solution’ route and accepted end user 
computing for what it was. The regulator noted the increasing use of spreadsheet control 
solutions, which removed the burden of compliance from the end user.  
 
The regulator noted some good news from the audit profession where they were seeing more 
mention of spreadsheets in audit reports and that increasingly EUC was part of the audit plan. 
The Sarbanes Oxley act had assisted in controlling EUC as it required firms to demonstrate 
that controls around financial reporting are adequate. This requires the auditor to assess the 
effectiveness of managements’ assessment of internal controls. It was noted that the 
requirement to demonstrate that effective EUC controls are in place was particularly onerous 
because EUC applications are usually not documented. Most problems however, were still 
the result of poor use of EUC solutions. Good training was an obvious solution, but there was 
little budget. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We have shown in previous sections and the literature supporting them that:  
 
a) there is a large research base extending back over twenty years demonstrating 
that spreadsheets pose significant risks to organisations 
b) spreadsheets are integral to the function and operation of the global financial 
system and most users of the financial system do not realise this  
c) catastrophic collapse of one form or another due to the use of untested 
spreadsheets in the financial markets was predicted several years ago 
d) a recent previous regional banking collapse was partly caused by the use and 
abuse of spreadsheets 
e) the UK financial regulator was fully cognisant of the risks of using spreadsheets 
within the banking and other regulated financial sectors, the related possibility of 
contagion and relevant technical problems in the use of spreadsheet based monte 
carlo techniques to compute VAR based capital requirements  
f) credit derivatives were identified as being particularly reliant on spreadsheets 
g) a systemic collapse of the global financial system occurred during the period 
2007-2009 where credit derivatives played a significant part in the destruction of 
capital 
 
We have confidence in concluding that spreadsheets played a rôle, perhaps even a significant 
rôle, in the recent collapse of the financial system, affirming our research hypothesis. In our 
opinion, their primary rôle is centred around the fact that they were one of the principal 
technologies used in the Credit Derivatives marketplace. This market grew very quickly due 
to the ease with which it was possible to design and promulgate opaque financial instruments 
based on large spreadsheets with critical flaws in their key assumptions. Their secondary rôle 
is centred around their ubiquitous use such that many of the problems experienced in Jamaica 
– specifically the difficulty in valuing or risk assessing complex financial instruments pre and 
post crash contributed to the cause of the crash and the difficulties experienced in recovering 
from it. The tertiary rôle of spreadsheets is related to the issues associated with human error 
and other human factors, which are no doubt compounding difficulties in market recovery 
and will remain a problem for the future unless and until resolved. 
 
During the course of the preparation of this article, we have identified a further set of risks 
associated with spreadsheets (and, by implication, other forms of end user computing). These 
give rise to the suspicion that the global financial system may be deeply flawed, requiring 
extensive modification and repair. Despite the recent recapitalisation and part nationalisation 
of the institutions, most of the spreadsheets still remain. In many cases these spreadsheets 
will now be operated by people not familiar with them and almost certainly outside of the 
domain where their assumptions and formulae were hoped to hold true. We are confident in 
predicting that further obvious problems with the financial system will come to light for some 
time unless and until untested and controlled spreadsheets play a less significant rôle in the 
financial system.  
 
The ubiquitous use of uncontrolled spreadsheet technology leaves the financial system open 
to future systemic problems. Certain parts of the financial system have been homogenised by 
the ubiquitous use of spreadsheets. Those parts of the financial system are thus exposed to all 
the risks of spreadsheets, not merely the lack of testing or control. Note that the more 
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heterogeneous interoperating systems developed using traditional IT methods which 
implement other parts of the financial system (eg cash transmission & retail banking), did not 
fail. 
 
Arguably, if there had been a requirement that CDO’s and such like had to be implemented or 
valued within traditional IT systems, or in spreadsheets using the full software development 
lifecycle, the CDO may never have seen the light of day.  
 
7 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Clearly, it is important that the financial system is resilient and stable enough to support the 
global economy. In our view, given the critical and burgeoning risks of spreadsheets and their 
ubiquity, this cannot happen without extensive changes in the demographics of their use & 
management [Powell, Baker, Lawson, 2005]. When we make a journey on public transport 
by air, rail, road or sea, there is high probability of our safe arrival. The same should apply to 
our expectations of surviving a financial journey, and much change will be required to 
achieve this. 
 
Our previous recommendations still apply: 
 
“As it is impossible to imagine the City of London operating without the widespread 
use of large spreadsheets, it is important to encourage firms to identify, prioritise, test, 
correct and control Key and Critical spreadsheets. Doing so will enable firms to 
improve profitability by avoiding the inevitable occurrence of large spreadsheet 
related mistakes, of which only the smallest and least embarrassing are being 
reported. Other actions that can be taken include: educating the market regarding the 
financial, regulatory and other risks of uncontrolled spreadsheet use; improving the 
regulatory framework regarding their use; promoting the emerging discipline of 
spreadsheet engineering; training management and staff to build & test more robust 
spreadsheet models; deploying software tools for detecting and correcting errors; 
deploying software tools to assist in the management of spreadsheets; encouraging the 
development of next generation spreadsheet technology and investigating other tools 
that have the advantages of spreadsheets but fewer or different disadvantages”.[Croll, 
2005] 
 
A very few organisations have voluntarily adopted Enterprise Spreadsheet Management 
systems, implementing them mainly on a departmental rather than a strategic basis. There is 
no evidence in the public domain or accessible to us that suggests that these control systems 
are truly effective during long-term use in the financial sector, though it is our hope and 
expectation that they are. We need to determine by detailed examination of the systems 
already in place that spreadsheet control systems do give the requisite degree of long term 
control to spreadsheet based financial systems, or financial systems where spreadsheets play 
a significant rôle.  
 
Having determined that it is possible to effectively control spreadsheets, the regulators must 
compulsorily require that all participants in the global financial system discover, risk assess, 
test and control the use of spreadsheets already in place as part of the system. Spreadsheets 
that necessarily must become part of the financial system must go through the full software 
development lifecycle [Grossman, 2002]. They must be designed, implemented and 
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controlled by people professionally trained in their creation, testing and deployment. This can 
only happen through global governmental and regulatory cooperation and may, due to cost, 
require a reduction in the scale and scope of the regulated financial system. 
 
If it is the case that we cannot build a safe and effective global financial system using 
spreadsheets as a key component, then we will have no alternative but to gradually replace 
them, which will be time consuming and expensive, if indeed it is possible at all. The 
decision to replace a spreadsheet or set of spreadsheets with an alternative is a 
straightforward commercial decision, influenced by regulatory considerations, which would 
look at the risks, costs and benefits of each of the alternatives.  
 
Finally, in our attempt to build a better financial system, it is very important to note that a 
century of research on human error informs us that humans have predictable limitations in 
many cognitive domains, including spreadsheets [Panko, 2007]. These limitations must be 
taken into consideration as we make decisions about technologies including spreadsheets. 
Panko’s conclusions provide excellent strategic guidance, which we would be unwise to 
ignore: 
 
“It is fundamentally important to understand that the problem is not spreadsheets. 
Asking what is wrong with spreadsheets has some value, but it is fundamentally the 
wrong issue. The real issue is that thinking is bad. Of course, thinking has some 
benefits, and we are accurate 96% to 98% of the time when we do think……The second 
fundamental thing to understand from human error research is that making large 
spreadsheets error free is theoretically and practically impossible….. {and to attempt 
to do so} is a testament to the profound human tendency to overestimate their ability to 
control their environment even when they cannot. The third fundamental thing to 
understand is that replacing spreadsheets with packages does not eliminate errors and 
many not even reduce them. The problem, again, is that thinking is bad. Unless there 
are no human decisions or design actions in using a package, there will be thinking, 
and therefore there will be errors” [Panko, 2007]  
 
We nevertheless hope that this paper has set out many of the hitherto largely unknown risks 
of the use of spreadsheets in the global financial system such that better informed decisions 
regarding their future use can be made. Whatever technology choices are made for the future, 
human factors [Thorne & Ball, 2005] will remain the overarching consideration.  
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